If the goal of the United
States is to create an effective, global anti-terrorist network, the
current strategy of bombing Afghanistan is counterproductive.
The decision for
war. On September 20, nine days after the horrendous
terrorist attacks in the United States, President George W. Bush
declared in a nationwide address that the Taliban government of
Afghanistan must turn over to the U.S. Osama bin Laden and other
suspected terrorists or face the wrath of the United States. Bush said
that he would not negotiate with the Taliban government. Taliban
leaders, for their part, asked for evidence of bin Laden's involvement
in the terrorist crimes of September 11th and said they would only hand
suspected terrorists over to an international agency.
With his ultimatum unmet,
President Bush decided that the Taliban government must be removed by
force. On October 7, U.S. warplanes and cruise missiles attacked
Taliban military sites and suspected terrorist training camps. At the
same time, U.S. cargo planes dropped thousands of U.S. meal packets to
help feed Afghan refugees fleeing the bombing. After destroying all
known military sites, the U.S. began on October 30 to bomb
concentrations of Taliban troops. A number of errant bombs were
reported to have killed an undetermined number of civilians.
The Bush administration's
bombing strategy is linked to a wider political strategy aimed at
weakening the Taliban government and encouraging its opponents to
overthrow it. Presumably, the new government would allow U.S. forces to
thoroughly search Afghanistan for suspected terrorists. Thus far,
however, the Taliban remains firmly in power while its opponents remain
weak and divided. The one rebel group that has the military potential
for taking power, the Northern Alliance, is unacceptable to most
Afghans, as it is composed of different ethnic groups than the Pashtun
majority and its previous rule from 1992 to 1996 was marked by
widespread abuse and repression.
The limits of war.
It is possible that continued U.S. bombing along with limited U.S.
combat missions and substantial U.S. aid to the Northern Alliance could
succeed in ousting the Taliban government - at a cost of many Afghan
lives and some American lives. Yet the U.S. may win the battle against
the Taliban only to lose the larger war against terrorism. The U.S. may
still fail to capture bin Laden and other terrorists thought to be
hiding in Afghanistan. In the meantime, the U.S. will be responsible
for establishing a new government in a foreign land full of violent
tribal rivalries, murky ethnic politics, and starving refugees. The
overthrow of the Taliban government is, after all, only a secondary
objective - only valuable insofar as it allows the U.S. to capture of
suspected terrorists.
If
the U.S. does succeed in capturing or killing Osama bin Laden through
its military campaign in Afghanistan, the American public will no doubt
be pleased. But the military precedent in this case may nevertheless
undermine the wider global struggle against terrorism - for two
reasons.
First,
Muslims in the area stretching from Northwest Africa to Southeast Asia
generally oppose U.S. militarism in their region. More than a few
governments have expressed concern that U.S. bombing attacks in
Afghanistan are killing innocent people and creating hundreds of
thousands of refugees, many of whom could die in the coming winter
months. Three weeks after the bombing began, the president of Pakistan
called for an end to it.
Further
U.S. military action will only further alienate Muslim and Arab allies
in the region; and without their cooperation, our ability to gather
intelligence and prevent terrorist acts will be sorely limited. The
terrorists who hijacked the U.S. jets on September 11th were not from
Afghanistan, but from Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Egypt,
countries allied with the United States.
Should
the U.S. lose the already tenuous support of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia,
Egypt, and other predominantly Muslim nations, the U.S. will most
assuredly fail in its primary objective -- to create an effective,
global anti-terrorist network that can find and apprehend suspected
terrorists, and anticipate and prevent terrorist acts in the future.
The second downside of U.S.
military action in Afghanistan is that it sets a dangerous and
impractical precedent. The U.S. State Department currently lists Iran,
Syria, and Iraq as "terrorist" states. Is the U.S. going to take
military action against these nations as well? Suppose there is
evidence that China is harboring international terrorists. Will the
U.S. engage in a war against China, with its 1.2 billion people? The
current war strategy against Afghanistan seems plausible to many
Americans only because Afghanistan is weak, with no ability whatsoever
to strike back at the U.S.
Terrorism is a problem for all
nations, not just the United States. Imagine that international
terrorists attacked a major trade center in Belgium. Would it be
advisable or feasible for Belgium to conduct a military attack on, say,
Libya, for allegedly harboring terrorists? Or imagine if Japan were
attacked. Would we approve of a Japanese attack on, say, the
Philippines?
The
struggle against anti-terrorism must be global in nature, with nations
sharing intelligence and cooperating in finding and bringing suspected
terrorists to trial in international courts. The current U.S. war
against Afghanistan has diverted attention from the necessary task of
establishing an effective, long-term, global anti-terrorist network.
Potential
repercussions of war. During the month of November, the Bush
administration will no doubt push for victory over the Taliban
government - by aiding the Northern Alliance and introducing U.S.
troops as needed. This military strategy will increasingly come into
conflict with the political sensitivities of U.S. allies in the region.
If the war continues through the winter and into next year, the
potential for further complications will markedly increase. Allied
governments in the region, such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt,
will be under increasing pressure from Muslim fundamentalists to break
with the U.S.; and radical Muslim militants will increase their efforts
to undermine or overthrow these pro-Western governments and establish
Islamic fundamentalist regimes.
Should the government of
Pakistan fall to militant fundamentalists, that nation's nuclear
arsenal would fall into their hands as well. The potential for war with
India - possibly a nuclear war - would increase, while cooperation with
the West would diminish. Many of the training camps in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, which the U.S. has identified as bin Laden's training camps,
have actually been used by Muslim militants to prepare for attacks
against Hindus in the Indian state of Kashmir.
Should the Saudi government fall
or be pressured to move away from its pro-Western position, U.S. oil
supplies could suffer. The U.S. has maintained a military base in Saudi
Arabia since 1990 in part to assure stability in Saudi Arabia. If
fundamentalist opposition grows, however, the U.S. may find itself
embroiled in a civil war to protect the ruling Saudi family.
Israel, America's close
ally in the Middle East, may also suffer should Muslim opposition to
the U.S. war in Afghanistan increase. Of late, U.S. leaders have been
encouraging Israel to avoid military retribution for Palestinian
attacks and to pursue diplomatic avenues, but Israel is reluctant to do
so. Israeli leaders say they are only doing what the U.S. is doing in
Afghanistan - rooting out terrorism. Hard-line Israeli policies against
Palestinians combined with the one-sided U.S. war against Afghanistan
could catalyze increased support for militant Palestinian groups,
thereby undermining any possibility of peace.
Alternatives to war.
The U.S. should forego its military strategy of overturning the Taliban
government and instead work through international courts and agencies
to apprehend suspected terrorists. This would entail presenting
evidence to an international court and creating an international team
to negotiate with the Taliban government as well as other governments
to turn over accused terrorists to the court. If negotiations failed,
it would be up to the international community to pursue a common
action, perhaps a military action, against the resisting government(s).
Military action would thus not be precluded under international law,
but it would be the last resort, not the first resort, and it would be
undertaken in cooperation with the international community, not
primarily a unilateral action undertaken by the United States.
The benefits of approaching
the problem of terrorism in this way would be numerous: lives would be
saved and the U.S. would not be responsible for the killing of Taliban
soldiers and innocent civilians; the U.S. would strengthen its ties
with moderate governments in predominantly Muslim nations and dampen
militant appeals in those nations, thereby enhancing stability in the
region; the fight against terrorism would have a permanent locus,
enabling cooperation among nations and providing continuity; and
militarism would diminish in favor of resolving differences through
international diplomacy and law.
Some of the infrastructure for a
global anti-terrorism campaign has been established and some will need
to be established. Already underway is a permanent International Court
of Justice, which will be able to bring to trial any person charged
with committing crimes against humanity. Serbian leader Slobodan
Milosevic is currently being tried in a temporary international court
of justice. On the drawing board is a proposal for a United Nations
Rapid Deployment force, a 6,000 member UN police force that could be
deployed within fifteen days of a Security Council resolution and would
be limited to a maximum deployment of six months. (A bill in Congress,
H.R. 938, calling on the U.S. to support the UN Rapid Deployment Force
had 44 co-sponsors as of August 8, 2001.)
The understandable response to
the September 11th terrorist attacks among Americans is to want to see
results - Osama bin Laden and other suspected terrorists captured or
killed, the Taliban overthrown, and terrorist networks neutralized. The
Bush administration has pushed military action and much of the public
has endorsed this course of action, if polls are to be believed. Yet,
it would be well to step back and take a longer view of the situation -
in light of the long-term goal of creating an effective, global
anti-terrorist network.
The
United States has a history of shortsighted policies that have come
back to haunt us. In 1953, the U.S. helped overthrow the government of
Iran, only to have the U.S.-backed government under the Shah of Iran
overthrown by a radical Islamic regime in 1979. In the 1980s, the U.S.
aided Iraq in its ten-year war against Iran, only to fight Iraqi forces
after they invaded Kuwait in 1990. Also in the 1980s, the U.S.
supported militant Islamic rebels fighting in Afghanistan against a
Soviet-backed government. Among these "freedom fighters," as President
Ronald Reagan called them, was Osama bin Laden and the Taliban. Now,
the U.S. has declared the Taliban an enemy with whom the U.S. cannot
negotiate.
Currently,
the U.S. war in Afghanistan is undermining our long-term goals by
alienating key allies, creating instability in the region, diverting
attention the creation of a common infrastructure to fight terrorism,
and setting a militaristic precedent whereby powerful nations feel
justified in attacking weaker ones.
It is not too late to reverse
directions. The U.S. can halt the bombing, negotiate with the Taliban
through Pakistan, and work through the UN Security Council to gain
access to alleged terrorists hiding in Afghanistan. It is not our
struggle alone. By supporting an international, criminal justice
approach to terrorism now, the U.S. can set the stage for increased
international cooperation in the future. This is not only a more humane
approach; it is also a more effective one.